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By Authority of The Commanding General Army Air Forces	
21 June 46	HTL
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25 JUN 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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Attention: Acting Chief, Support Branch, [REDACTED]**Subject:** Interim Survey of the Adequacy of Intelligence Facilities
Related to the National Security

1. Reference subject paper dated 13 June 1946, the following information is submitted from the office of AC/AS-2:

a. The recommended strength of this office to fulfill the requirements of the post-war Air Intelligence mission was:

(1)	147 officers
(2)	9 enlisted personnel
(3)	61 professional civilians
(4)	398 civilians
Total	615

This figure represents a minimum of personnel required to accomplish the Air Intelligence mission and was arrived at after exhaustive studies supervised personally by the AC/AS-2.

b. The current authorized strength for this office is shown as follows:

(1)	114 officers
(2)	9 enlisted personnel
(3)	48 professional civilians
(4)	237 civilians
Total	408

c. Many functions and activities of this office have been eliminated, delegated or curtailed because of these reduced authorizations.

- (1) Within the organizational structure of this office there are three divisions. These are: The Air Intelligence Division, Air Information Division, and the Executive Division. The Air Intelligence Division was established under JCS 1020/3. Its functions are as follows:

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- (a) Produces Air Intelligence necessary to Headquarters, AAF, for command decisions and counsel upon air preparedness and air operations. This will consist primarily of continuing estimates of the following:
 - 1. Alien forces including air weapons and counter-air weapons, their offensive capabilities in relation to our strategic vulnerability and their defensive capabilities against offensive operations.
 - 2. Specific strategic and general tactical objectives for air operations, including analysis of their physical vulnerability to these operations.
 - 3. Conditions and installations in alien areas of particular concern to possible air operations, notably airfields, and weather.
 - 4. Provides the Air Intelligence required by the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Central Intelligence Group, and such other inter-departmental intelligence, as necessary.
- (2) Although none of the functions of the Air Intelligence Division have been eliminated completely, this division is now operating below a minimum requirement to perform its mission. It must be emphasized that this division is the only intelligence agency that can or should produce Air Intelligence.
- (3) The Air Information Division has been seriously affected by reductions of personnel. Some of the specific activities that have been eliminated, delegated and curtailed in the Air Information Division are as follows:

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- (a) Air Forces representation on the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, reading panel has been curtailed far below the minimum requirement. This curtailment affects the flow of air information, collected by the War Department, to the Air Forces, which deprives this office of necessary information that is subject only to the availability of personnel.
 - (b) The DICK TRACY Project (captured photo intelligence). Processing of this material has been drastically curtailed. This project was instigated to exploit photographic coverage as a source of information on Germany, Poland, and parts of Russia. It is the only source of target intelligence on some of these vital areas. Its importance cannot be over-emphasized, and it remains unexploited because of lack of personnel.
 - (c) Post-war Mapping and Charting Project. This project concerns the worldwide photographic coverage for mapping and charting. Only initial work has been accomplished at this time. To date we have no coverage on strategic portions of the world, without which our global Air Force cannot operate nor can guided missiles be employed. Responsibilities for global coverage is a national requirement and must not be curtailed because of inadequate representation. Initial coverage on some areas has been obtained, but shortages of personnel prevents processing this material. This not only deprives the Military Intelligence but Governmental Agencies of needed information.
 - (d) Combat Photography. Pre-strike and post-attack photographs are a most valuable source of target intelligence. Without proper processing information on areas covered will be of no value to the Air Forces Intelligence System. With adequate processing of these photographs many things can be determined, such as identification of areas, physical vulnerability and functional aspects of those areas. It is conceivable that these areas might revert into alien hands in the near future, and such a situation would require immediate intelligence on these objectives.

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- (e) I.P.D.P. (Photographic Coverage of European Coast, Industry, Terrain, etc.) This project is concerned with a photographic coverage of the European coast line, major industrial facilities and terrain features. The processing of this photography was started in March, 1946. The backlog to date is about 3,000 prints. If the Topographical Branch of the Office of Director of Intelligence had sufficient personnel to transmit this material to the Air Forces for processing, this backlog would be much greater. This is another valuable source of Air Intelligence that remains untouched because of the shortage of personnel.

d. Effective 30 June 1946 this office is being reduced an additional 39 civilians and three officer vacancies. It is understood that further reductions will also be forthcoming, inasmuch as the War Department Manpower Board surveyed this office and recommended certain reductions, and the Office of AC/AS-1 has conducted a survey with a view toward reducing the strength of Hq. AAF. Both of these surveys have been conducted by personnel who have given little, if any, consideration to the importance of Air Intelligence and are forced to resort to arbitrary recommendations in order to effect an overall cut in Headquarters strength.

e. The reductions in personnel indicated in d above will affect AC/AS-2 activities as follows:

- (1) The DICK TRACY Project will be suspended.
- (2) The I.P.D.P. Project will be drastically curtailed.
- (3) The indexing of photography by machine records will be suspended.
- (4) Photography furnished for intelligence and intelligence training purposes to the Air Forces, Ground Forces, etc. will be drastically reduced.

It should also be noted that the development of intelligence functions delegated to the major commands is interrelated with that of this headquarters and is mutually supporting. The original strength of the AC/AS-2 organization was based on this anticipated development, which never materialized due to curtailment from the outset by personnel reduction.

f. The above reductions and elimination of functions have affected agencies under the purview of this office in that this office

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has been unable to fulfill its responsibilities to subordinate commands in maintaining Headquarters' responsibility of supervision, and in maintaining the Headquarters' responsibility for its part of the two-way flow of information. Intelligence activities performed by this office for other agencies have been and will be curtailed: specifically as respects overall air intelligence estimates, representation on various committees, furnishing photographic information to other agencies, etc.

g. The organization of the Office of AC/AS-2 is adequate to meet the peacetime mission of Air Intelligence as defined by the Air Forces and the National Intelligence Authority, but the number of personnel allocated to this office is inadequate to accomplish this mission.

h. The following additional authorizations of personnel are considered as a minimum requirement to accomplish the mission of Air Intelligence:

33 officers
13 professional civilians
161 civilians

Additional proportionate office space is also necessary. These additions of personnel and space are necessary to fulfill the overall requirements of Air Intelligence, and do not include any additional functions that might be delegated to this office from higher authority. Furthermore this office cannot depend on supporting organizations to assume these additional functions due to their commensurate decrease in personnel. Participation of the Navy in the Air Intelligence Division is the only reason this division has been able to function.

i. Until such time as the overall survey of intelligence activities relating to the National security is completed and resulting decisions have been implemented, it is recommended that as an interim measure the members of the N.I.A. issue a directive to their respective departments of State, War and Navy to suspend further reduction of personnel authorizations in intelligence agencies represented in the Central Intelligence Group; and allocate such additional authorizations as necessary to accomplish their respective intelligence missions.

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SECRET- 5 -